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In the summer of 2009, I visited the Rockefeller Archive Center (RAC) as part of pre-
dissertation research into U.S.-sponsored World War II-era soil conservation and agricultural 
development programs in Latin American indigenous communities. My primary objective was to 
consult the personal papers of Nelson A. Rockefeller (Record Group 4 in the Rockefeller Family 
Archives) pertaining to his work as President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Coordinator of Inter-
American Affairs. My work at the RAC was conducted as a complement to preliminary research 
at the U.S. National Archives in Record Group 229, Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American 
Affairs. 
My objective in examining Nelson Rockefeller's files from his work directing the World War II-
era Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) -- later the Office of Inter-
American Affairs (OIAA) -- was to gain a sense of how agency economic policies and programs 
functioned to realize U.S. foreign policy more broadly in this period. My focus, then, was on 
internal memorandum, committee reports, and policy analysis dealing particularly with economic 
policy and development planning. An ancillary benefit to conducting research at the RAC was 
the outstanding records of Rockefeller Foundation-funded research throughout the twentieth 
century. Through field reports from scientists and program officers in Latin America, I was able 
to gain key insights into U.S. development policy and local production practices during the 
1940s and early 1950s. 
At the advent of the Second World War, the United States found itself in a sensitive position in 
relation to what the State Department referred to as the "other American nations." First, war-time 
activities and anti-colonial impulses in Africa and Asia made the raw materials from these areas 
difficult to obtain. At the same time, global instability based in these same developments 
undermined the international hegemony of European powers, opening the door for the United 
States to assert economic and political influence of an unprecedented scale and structure. 
By 1940 it was clear that ambitions for both war-time and post-war success rested on securing 
U.S. access to the territories and raw materials of Latin America. A hand-written memo from the 
Bureau of the Budget at the Office of the President dated June, 1940 declared that "the economic 
policy for the hemisphere should rest on two points: 1. Positive contributions to the prosperity of 
all countries of the hemisphere. 2. Protection and development of sources of raw material needed 
for the U.S.... Protection and development of sources of raw materials should be undertaken if 
possible by private interests but if necessary by public." [1] Making explicit reference to 
effective strategies employed by the Napoleonic, British, and German imperial armies, officials 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt's executive branch set about to secure their interests through a 
comprehensive "war on all fronts," including Army, economics, propaganda, and 
diplomacy.[2] Created in 1940, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs was 
charged with orchestrating these efforts in the American hemisphere. 
As Franklin Roosevelt's pick to head the newly formed OCIAA, Nelson Rockefeller's most 
immediate challenge was supplanting embedded Axis economic and political interests in South 
America. In a 1941 State Department document entitled "Suggestions for Political-Economic 
Warfare to Prevent Nazification of Latin-America," Victor Petrullo warns: "If any further major 
German victories [occur], LA frankly admits they expect Nazi-inspired coup d'etats. We must 
prevent this by pacific means if possible and [the] best way is by attacking political and 
economic problems. Nazism has offered a 'better' life and also freedom from Yankee domination. 
Their strength is the fact that no feasible alternative has been offered to the LA people by U.S." 
Further, Petrullo argues, the lack of such action on the part of countries like the U.S. was rooted 
in a fear that advocacy of democracy would "lessen [Latin America's] colonial dependency," the 
very Yankee domination that made the Nazi program so appealing to many Latin American 
leaders. While many of the Axis connections were maintained through German economic and 
cultural interests in South America, and particularly in Argentina and Brazil, the Falangists in 
Spain laid claim to a deeper, historical network of cultural and political connections. In this 
sense, U.S. efforts to cultivate a Pan-American solidarity in this period can be seen as pitted 
against the Pan-Hispanism represented by Latin American Falangism.[3] 
Further complicating the situation was an affinity among many potential anti-Axis allies in Latin 
America for Communist or socialist political change.[4]  Indeed, the expansion of U.S. resource 
interests in the Americas was also challenged by such interests. Rockefeller's personal files 
included a report in O'Shaunessy's Oil Bulletin citing a recent decision by the Colombian 
Supreme Court to "greatly extend the area of Government-reserved oil rights in public lands," 
reversing a lower court's confirmation of Royal Dutch Shell's title to that area. Returning from an 
earlier trip through Latin America in the wake of the Mexican Revolution, Nelson Rockefeller 
himself had warned U.S. corporate investors that corporate interests in Latin America needed to 
manage its assets with the best interests of the local people in mind or face the possibility that 
"they will take away our ownership."[5] 
Further, the Oil Bulletin cites an alliance between elements of the Colombian Conservative 
Party, Nazi sympathizers, and Spanish Falangists to oppose a loan from the U.S. to finance 
Colombian military armaments.[6] In some instances, such as in the case of the Mexican 
government, property formerly held by private U.S. interests had reverted to Latin American 
states as part of national reform programs.[7] It was the State Department's conclusion that, 
while Communist groups were not desirable, the threat they posed was "by no means as serious 
as the Nazi [threat] in Latin America."[8]  Though the elimination of Axis influence would 
effectively eliminate any political leverage on the part of the left, Rockefeller's wartime strategy 
would need to appeal to interests across the political spectrum. Indians, youth, and organized 
social groups such as physicians, school teachers, tradesmen, and unionists were seen as 
potentially effective targets for such appeals.[9] 
While much of this work was initiated on the cultural front via film, radio, and periodicals such 
as En Guardia, the OIAA Spanish-language magazine distributed across the Americas,[10] these 
efforts were conducted in concert with a concurrent program of economic interventions.  In 
addition to the insertion of U.S. capital, personnel, and training capacities, the OIAA and the 
U.S. government took "negative" measures to eliminate embedded German pharmaceutical, 
banking, extractive, and other economic interests in the region. An illustrative example is the 
airline industry, in which the United States -- through the Defense Supply Corporation -- bought 
out German-owned airlines around the Americas and revoked franchises of such organizations in 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Further, they initiated and funded an Inter-American Escadrille to 
encourage domestic flying in the civil sector and provided funds for more than 300 would-be 
Latin American pilots to train in the United States.[11] 
Part of the U.S. strategy to secure regional political cooperation was the "parity treatment 
principle." Resolved by the Board of Economic Warfare on December 26, 1941, the so-called 
parity principle made formal a policy of the U.S. government to "aid in maintaining the 
economic stability of the other American Republics by recognizing and providing for their 
essential civilian needs on the basis of equal and proportionate consideration with our own." 
Notably, the parity principle did not guarantee parity among and between citizens, but rather the 
distribution of essential, high-demand raw materials between national economies. Under-
Secretary of State Sumner Welles seconded this sentiment at the 1942 Meeting of Foreign 
Ministers in Rio de Janeiro, declaring that the government of the United States "stands prepared 
to render financial and technical assistance, where needed, to alleviate injury to the domestic 
economy of any of the American Republics which results from the control and curbing of 
economic activities inimical to our common defense...[and to] enter into broad arrangements for 
the acquisition of supplies of basic and strategic materials, and to cooperate with each of the 
other American Republics in order to increase rapidly and efficiently their production for 
emergency needs."[12] 
Among the recommendations of State Department experts was a program to raise the standard of 
living among Latin American peasants to mitigate their interest in large-scale, ideologically 
motivated social change, including communism and Fascism.[13]  The programs the OIAA 
funded did, indeed, seek to raise the standard of living among this group through professional 
training, public health and education campaigns. Finally, because much of the Latin American 
peasantry lived in rural communities, agricultural specialists and materials were dispatched 
around the Americas with the mission of modernizing farming practices in these 
communities.[14] 
Initially, funding also extended to the Inter-American Indian Institute and the National Indian 
Institute, the U.S. branch of this organization. As time went on, conflicts between these 
organizations and officers at the OIAA and a general lack of OIAA commitment to Indian issues 
resulted in a termination of support for these agencies.[15] In general, the OIAA under Nelson 
Rockefeller was concerned less with staking a position in the racial politics underlying Latin 
American economic reform movements than in pursuing a program of social reform based in 
expanded production. 
If OIAA agricultural development programs in this period had the objective of pacifying 
potentially fractious peasant populations, they were also designed with other U.S. interests in 
mind. Such programs, along with public health programs, were situated in close proximity to 
industrial and extractive programs designed to provide raw materials to U.S. corporate and 
military interests.[16] While Nelson Rockefeller's OIAA records at the Rockefeller Archive 
Center are generally concerned more with macro-level organizational planning than with the 
specific details of any of these particular programs, one agricultural project -- the stimulation of 
rubber production -- was of sufficient importance and interest to be retained in the Coordinator's 
personal files.  While the case of rubber production was in some ways exceptional, it does offer 
useful insight into ways that the OIAA set about realizing abstract U.S. goals on the ground in 
Latin American agricultural communities during the Second World War. 
In a lengthy statement delivered before the Senate Defense Investigating Committee by Earl N. 
Bressman, Director of the OIAA's Agricultural Division (and previously chief scientific advisor 
to then-Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace), offered a useful and extensive summary of 
the U.S. rubber production program. This work was part of a larger program that stressed the 
cultivation of agricultural products in the Americas that would be complementary (rather than 
competitive) with existing commodity crop production in the United States. This strategy sought 
to both compensate for the loss of key crops like rubber, quinine, and spice previously grown in 
European colonies. At the same time, it would protect U.S. farmers from competition and, by 
turning Latin American cropland over to non-subsistence products, stimulate a market for U.S.-
grown food stuffs. 
In the case of rubber, diminished access to Asian supplies had serious implications for U.S. 
industry. At the outset of the Second World War, more than 96% of the world's supply of rubber 
came from Asia, with the United States as the largest consumer of that supply (purchasing 
roughly 50% of that crop annually). Encouraging rubber cultivation in the Americas, then would 
allow what Bressman referred to as "rubber independence" from Asian supplies and the 
European financial interests that controlled them. While Ford and Goodyear had been working 
on developing this production in Brazil and Costa Rica and Panama, it was still inadequate to the 
growing U.S. demand. Further, a lack of labor supply for this industry posed a further problem in 
the development of the industry. 
In 1940, the U.S. Senate appropriated $500,000 for research and development of this industry in 
Latin America. In 1941, these programs were transferred (with Bressman) to the OIAA, where 
they had the "vigorous support of the Coordinator." Sixteen rubber production experts were sent 
to Latin America under the auspices of this program, which oversaw the start of more than one 
hundred nurseries and the planting of over 30,000,000 rubber trees. A major development 
occurred in 1941, when the Haitian-American Development Corporation, under the leadership of 
President and General Manager Thomas A. Fennell, initiated a new method of tapping mature 
Castilla rubber trees. With more than 4,000 employees and plans to put more than 50,000 acres 
of land into rubber production, primarily on small, private plots held by individual Haitian 
farmers, Fennell's enterprise promised to revolutionize production across the Americas, initiating 
what Bressman called "American rubber independence."[17] This combination of strategic crop 
selection, geographically-sensitive scientific and technical research, personnel training, and 
capital investment characterized much of the OIAA's agricultural development work in this 
period. 
Another important structural aspect to the OIAA's economic and cultural front was the institution 
of Coordination Committees for each of the Latin American nations. Composed of locally-
networked members of U.S. citizens in residence in Latin American nations, Coordination 
Committees married private interests and citizens with the public mobilization of the OIAA. 
Beginning in 1941, local OIAA Field Offices were established to service and administer these 
groups. By 1943, there were chapters in twenty Latin American nations with membership 
ranging from two in Panama to 168 in Mexico.[18] Members of these groups were most often in 
residence representing the interests of American capital abroad. The Coordination Committee for 
Colombia, for example, included executives from the National City Bank of New York, 
American Coffee Company, the Tropical Oil Company and Richmond Petroleum Company 
(both subsidiaries of Standard Oil), and Singer Sewing Machine Co. In Peru, representatives of 
Southern Railways and the Cerro de Pasco Copper Corporation served as the local OIAA civilian 
contacts. The Mexican Central Committee leadership drew from a long list of successful U.S. 
corporations, including General Electric, Westinghouse & Co, Coca Cola, RCA Victor, Colgate-
Palmolive Peet, General Motors, and Ford Motor Company, with representatives from Huasteca 
Petroleum Corporation (owned by Los Angeles-based Pan-American Petroleum and Transport), 
R. G. Dunn & Bradstreet, American Smelting and Mining, and Price and Waterhouse & Co 
staffing sub-committees on black lists, economic stabilization, communications, and cultural 
relations, public health and welfare.[19]   Thus, U.S. war-time solidarity building was conducted 
through and in turn stimulated the existing networks of U.S. business interests abroad. 
Presumably, these networks would be mobilized and drawn upon in new ways within post-war 
economic development programs. 
While securing war-time resources and alliances was a central aspect of OIAA work in this 
period, equally important (and perhaps of greatest concern to its Coordinator) were its efforts to 
lay the foundations for post-war hemispheric relations. As early as 1940, Nelson Rockefeller's 
edited drafts of agency documents suggest that he was particularly concerned with the long-term 
balance of power that would result from war-time U.S. foreign policy. Under Rockefeller's 
administration, the OIAA demonstrated a commitment to the project of Pan-American solidarity 
negotiated among an assembly of distinct sovereign political interests. In 1943, Rockefeller kept 
for his personal files a copy of a WNYC radio speech by City College Professor Harry A. 
Overstreet entitled "International Cultural Relations."  In January 1944, Rockefeller sent a copy 
to Vice President Henry Wallace with a note that read, in part, "This seems to me to be one of 
the clearest analyses of our foreign relations which I have seen in some time." 
Overstreet's speech states that after the war, the United States would be in the relatively 
distasteful position of having "to impose our will on defeated people." Arguing that, in general, 
the U.S. should not necessarily remake the world in its own image, Overstreet makes a case that 
the post-war period represented an exceptional case: "There are two ideas which we have a right 
[after the war] to insist upon for the rebuilding of the world -- two ideas that are the essence of 
American democracy. The first of these is the idea of law as embodied in our Bill of Rights." He 
continues: "The second American idea which we can rightly insist upon is one which is 
expressed in the words: e pluribus unum. Out of many, one. The federal idea - the honor of 
whose establishment in the world we share with Switzerland - is perhaps the greatest 
contribution that has been made to political history. It solves the apparently insoluble problem: 
how to unite into one sovereign power many sovereign powers without infringing upon the 
general liberty of any of them. The time has now come when the federal idea must be adopted by 
the nations of the world. No nation, even the most powerful, can ever go it alone. All the nations 
together must unite to protect themselves against the possible aggression of any one or group of 
them. America can rightly insist that the spirit of e pluribus unum must now pervade the world. 
Overstreet's conclusion is that in order to effectively exercise its power to make such a demand 
against the world, it must achieve two things. First, it must cease to preach human equality and 
practice human inequality in the form of both domestic racism and the nationalist chauvinism 
that has prevented U.S. citizens from educating themselves about the history, geography, and 
cultures of the world. Second, the United States must "set as its chief goal the highest possible 
production together with the widest possible distribution under conditions of the maximum 
freedom for individual initiative and for the common welfare."[20]   
Both the cosmopolitanism and the assumption of an exceptional U.S. position in the post-war 
order were resonant with Rockefeller's objectives as Coordinator of the OIAA. In 1944 and 
1945, in subsequent drafts of U.S. economic foreign policy, Rockefeller's marginal notations 
were almost exclusively concerned with the question of U.S. leadership within the Pan-American 
alliance of sovereign nations. The recommendation that "The United States Government should 
provide continued and vigorous leadership in the field of liberal trade policies" was amended to 
include leadership in all economic fields. 
Rockefeller was particularly concerned with language suggesting that the United States would 
deliver technical and administrative assistance for the development of other American national 
economies only at the request of those countries. Rather, he felt that the U.S. should stimulate 
development in the Americas according to its own political agenda, and that the growth of 
national productive capacities would always be in the best interest of local people and 
economies. The initial draft of the document is marked throughout with notations about the 
importance of clear U.S. leadership, and in response to a closing statement that "the 
responsibility and execution of policies and projects related to economic development devolves 
upon [individual Latin American Republics]. United States cooperation, therefore, should be 
subject to the fact that the management and administration of such projects are the responsibility 
and concern of other American Republics," Rockefeller penned in large letters: "In other words, 
we follow rather than lead!?! We'll never hold the [Americas] together under our leadership on 
this basis."[21] Subsequent drafts of the document adhere more closely to Rockefeller's view on 
this point. 
Pan-American post-war economic development would hinge on two distinct categories of U.S. 
exports. The first was dissemination of U.S. industrial expertise in large-scale production. The 
Committee on Inter-American Economic Development identified what it saw as a concentration 
of limiting factors to economic development in Latin America. These included the lack of 
domestic purchasing power to justify rapid, large-scale industrial development, non-competitive 
regional pricing of raw materials, inadequate electricity and transportation infrastructure, limited 
pools of skilled workers and managerial competencies, and an underproductive agricultural 
sector hamstrung by outmoded farming methods.[22] Given the local availability of labor and 
raw materials, in the view of the committee, the United States government was best positioned to 
"make a substantial contribution to the economic development of the other American republics 
through its accumulated experience in the fields of technology and management." Further, "the 
utilization of this experience can also promote United States participation in that development," 
meaning that developing Latin American productive systems under the administration of U.S. 
experts would mean both a relevant expansion of U.S. knowledge and expertise to include Latin 
American productive systems as well as a guarantee that those systems could coherently 
articulate with such systems within the United States.[23] 
The second category of critical U.S. intervention lay in the possibility of the export of U.S. 
capital to the Americas in the form of goods as well as investment. The first recommendation of 
the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy made the explicit stipulation that "the 
Latin American Governments should recognize that economic development presupposes just and 
equitable political and fiscal treatment, including equality of treatment for foreign capital and 
personnel."[24] The OIAA was particularly interested in the possibility of Latin America as a 
market for the large volume of equipment and supplies the U.S. military had accrued over the 
course of the war. A 52-page 1944 report outlined the types and value of potentially available 
equipment and estimated how much and how quickly each developing American industrial 
economy could absorb surplus U.S. machinery. Stipulating that equipment be distributed through 
private U.S. firms, the OIAA Research Division proposed that these materials be used to help 
develop private U.S. distribution systems around the Americas. In addition, the sale of military 
surplus to developing Latin American nations would help eliminate the "substantial dollar 
balances" that accumulated over the course of the war.[25] 
By the end of the war, the elimination of the Axis threat had significantly shifted the balance of 
political power in the Americas. Early strategies to route German, Spanish, and Italian alliances 
by charting a moderate course between communist and Fascist political interests dissolved as 
communism and socialism emerged as the symbolic and practical targets of U.S. foreign policy 
and the United States set upon a program of inter-American development based on a free market, 
liberal trade policy. For Nelson Rockefeller, such a strategy was much closer to the ideology that 
would underwrite his own career in elected public office. In the decades that followed, the 
assertion of an exceptional U.S. power would continue to characterize inter-American political 
and economic relations. 
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